Keysmith

The cut

Press G for another

Entropy

— bits —

Time to guess

Assumes the attacker knows this exact recipe and has stolen the password file — 100 billion guesses per second against a fast hash. Half the search space, on average.

Words —

Word pools at least one

Numbers how many digits

Symbols ! " # % & / . ?

Letter case no entropy, all taste

+0.0 bits

Between words no entropy, all taste

+0.0 bits

Same recipe, five more

click any line to copy it

How this works. Every pick comes from crypto.getRandomValues with rejection sampling, so no word or digit is more likely than another. Nothing is generated on a server, so copy the one you want before you leave — a password you don't keep is gone for good. Recently drawn words also sit out for a spell, because true randomness will cheerfully hand you the same word three times in ten goes; that only affects the order you see them in, never the odds of guessing any one password.

You never see the same one twice. Every password that reaches this screen, the big one and all five alternates, goes into a ledger held in this browser and is never issued again. The ledger holds the last 20,000 and is never sent anywhere — which also means it doesn't follow you to another browser or a private window, and Reset lets old ones come back, so it asks twice.

The 13-character floor. Nothing shorter leaves this page. Keysmith first restricts itself to words long enough that your chosen recipe clears 13 on its own — that is why the word count sometimes reads 6+ letters. Only when no combination of words can get there (one word, no digits, no symbols) does it pad the end with extra random digits, and it says so under the count.

A word on the bits. The count assumes an attacker knows you used this tool with these exact settings and is only guessing the random parts. That is the honest number. A password that merely looks messy to a human is not the same thing, which is why Liverpool5666!? lands where it does.